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Available online 5 July 2012Abstract Confronted by a slowing economy, the Reserve Bank of India has undertaken steps to
revive it. These measures, however, run the risk of worsening current high levels of inflation.
This paper examines certain aspects of India’s financial system that have contributed to this situ-
ation. It argues that unduly low yields on Government bonds have prevented a healthy financial
system from developing, with adverse impact upon inflation and other macroeconomic
outcomes. It suggests that India should focus far more on domestic, and less on external, finan-
cial liberalisation. Specifically, yields on non-market borrowing, such as Provident Fund
deposits, should be benchmarked to a low frequency measure of consumer price inflation.
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Production and hosting by Elsevierstimulate the economy. With inflation expectations well
entrenched in double digits and growing purchases of
imported gold by the public, the RBI should be increasingly
compelled to pay attention to the need for ‘securing
monetary stability’, as per its original mandate.1 This
interview was conducted at IIM Bangalore on March 30th
against this backdrop of this situation. In this interview, I
try to broadly assess RBI policies under Governor Subbarao’s
stewardship, and also to seek out clarifications regarding
positions taken by the RBI on policy matters.
In making an assessment of RBI policies, certain
considerations need to be taken into account. Firstly,
various parameters outside the domain of the RBI affect the
economic situation, such as the Eurozone crisis. Secondly,n and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1 The Preamble to the Reserve Bank of India Act (1934) states
that, ‘.it is expedient to constitute a Reserve Bank of India to
regulate the issue of Bank notes and the keeping of reserves with
a view to securing monetary stability and to operate the currency
and credit system of the country to its advantage.’.
3 More advanced estimation techniques may involve a combination
of structural and time series methods such as those using DSGE
(Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium) models. For the USA, the
Congressional Budget Office (2004) provides a good summary of these
two basic alternative estimationmethods and also provides structural
estimates of potential GDP based on projections of labour hours.
4 In particular they use the HodrickePrescott filter, the Band Pass
method, Beveridge Nelson decomposition method, Univariate Unob-
served Components (UUC) model, Multivariate Observed Components
(MUC) model, and Structural Vector Auto Regression (SVAR) methods.
They find that for quarterly GDP data, estimates of potential GDP
growth vary from 8.1% to 9.5%, with the estimates concentrated
around 9.0%. They also estimate potential output from monthly
industrial production: the estimates range between 9.4 and 9.7%.
Their use of industrial production to estimate potential output for the
whole economy, which is now mainly services, is questionable.
5 The dwindling bullishness about India’s prospects is also evident
from the changing outlook in the Economic Survey, the flagship
publication of the Department of Economic Affairs, released a day
before the Union Budget. In February 2011, the Economic Survey had
projected growth of 9% for fiscal year April 2011eMarch 2012 just
past, and its introductory statement concluded that the economy is
‘poised to further improve and consolidate...’. However, this 9%
estimate has been revised down to 6.9% by the Central Statistical
Organisation (CSO) as of February 2012. While actual GDP growth
projections can and do go off track, the Economic Survey last year
86 V. Moorthymonetary policy works with long and variable lags. Hence
even though the Governor has been in this position for well
over three years, some of the outcomes are the result of
policies adopted much earlier. Thirdly, the initial condi-
tions when Governor Subbarao took office e just days
before the Lehman brothers collapse in September 2008 e
could not have been worse. Finally, the RBI is not fully
autonomous in its monetary policy and other decisions.
Keeping the above considerations in mind, the issues
raised here, and subsequent questions asked, have been
chosen for either their high, or immediate, policy rele-
vance. While these issues are all connected, they have
been categorised into three broad sections, with a few
miscellaneous questions at the end.
Political constraints, infrastructure and GDP growth
If one polled most economists, policy makers, journalists etc
over the years, as towhat is the critical constraint to growth,
the overwhelming response would be infrastructure.
However, in my opinion, this conclusion is rather inadequate
since the physical infrastructure is only the proximate
constraint. The underlying constraints to develop infra-
structure are political processes and governance e such as
regulated prices for petroleum products, coal, railway fares;
procedures for, and legal barriers to, land acquisition for
building roads etc. Accepting these constraints requires
drastically lowering estimates of India’s sustainable or
potential Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth, pending
reform of various administered prices and/or changes in the
land acquisition procedures (Potential GDP growth is
generally considered to be that growth rate, at which the
economy is in equilibrium, and which can be sustained over
several years without raising or lowering inflation).
The pricing of infrastructure and related items is a sepa-
rate, indeedneglected, issue fromthemagnitudeof thefiscal
deficit, generally considered to be the main drag on growth
via its negative impact on national savings. The prevalence of
pricecontrols andadministeredprices, thatarechangedfrom
time to time, for some critical products such as food and
petroleum, greatly complicates the statistical analysis of the
links between growth and inflation. In the presence of what
can be called ‘inflation in the pipeline’, macroeconomists
should reconsiderwhetherpreciseestimatesofpotentialGDP
growth, mechanically applying estimation techniques devel-
oped in advanced economies, are worthwhile at all.2
Although the concept of potential GDP is of over-
whelming importance, estimates based on statistical tech-
niques have led to erroneous policy conclusions. These
techniques are broadly of two types. First, structural
methods: projections of the inputs of capital and labour,
are coupled with estimates of total factor productivity
corresponding to technical progress, to get the estimates of
potential GDP. Second, time series methods which
mechanically use only past GDP data to arrive at potential
GDP. Time series methods range from estimating the simple2 The adverse impact of petroleum product price controls on
India’s economy and its sustainable growth is discussed in my
article, ‘Petro Pessimism about India’, mint, 10th June 2008.trend rate of growth to more complicated techniques
allowing for varying trends.3
For India, a fairly recent RBI study by Bordoloi, Das, and
Jangili (2009) using several, mostly time series methods, esti-
mated India’s potential GDP growth to be around 9%.4 Actual
GDP growth for the past fiscal year (2011e12) is likely to end
up below 7%, well below the 9% forecast last February. Given
that overall inflationary pressures have not reduced along with
the drop in growth, clearly the estimates of potential GDP
were too high. In effect, the boom years from 2004 to 2007
ended up being mechanically extrapolated by the RBI study
cited above, by the Finance Ministry and many others.5
Domestic versus external financial sector
liberalisation
There is a compelling need to critically examine India’s high
openness toexternalfinance,coupledwithsubstantial controls
on the domestic bond market.6 Since around 2000, the direc-
tion of policy has been more to liberalise the capital account
rather than the domestic financial markets, which were liber-
alised during the previous decade. Further, many measures to
develop the corporate bondmarket, that theRBI has instituted
over the years, will not be successful if the underlying
Government bond market is hampered in basic ways.
In open domestic bond markets, the well known Fisher
effect linking borrowers and lenders generally holds. Nominal
rates on bonds normally correctly incorporate inflation. The
Fisher equation (i.e. the nominal rate of interest equals the
real rate of interest plus expected inflation) is perhaps the
strongest empirical relationship in financial macroeconomics,had also implicitly overestimated India’s potential GDP growth. The
tone and content of this year’s Survey is more muted.
6 This section, and related questions in this interview, partly
draws upon my comments (Moorthy, 2011) on the paper by Rhee
and Veron at the Institute of Growth Economics (Seoul) and Asian
Development Bank joint conference.
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true for external borrowing. The uncovered interest parity
(UIP) condition or equation (i.e. a currency should depreciate
against another currency based on their interest rate differ-
ential) can be thought of as the open economy analogue of the
Fisher equation. Yet across the globe, under conditions of high
to full capital account convertibility, the uncovered interest
parity condition has failed, and often miserably.7
The failure of the UIP condition manifests itself in the
well known ‘carry trade’: borrowing in the low interest rate
currency and investing in the high interest rate currency,
profiting from both the interest rate differential and the
tendency for the high interest rate currency to, most often,
appreciate. When the carry trade reverses, the currency
with the high interest rate suddenly collapses.8 To some
extent, India has insulated itself against the carry trade by
imposing restrictions on short-term debt. However, our
capital account policy has been relatively liberal towards
foreign investment in Indian equities. As is well known, the
Foreign Institutional Investors (FIIs), despite holding a rela-
tively small portion of total equity, play a dominant role in
affecting equity prices by their trading on the Sensex. The
rupee normally rises against the US dollar on a day when
FIIs enter the market in a big way, and falls when they exit.
The gyrations of the rupee in accordance withmovements
in the Sensex may cancel out at lower frequency with no
direct overall macroeconomic impact. However, these
gyrations greatly divert the attention of the policy makers
and the media towards the rupee’s external value and away
from its internal value, which should be their main preoc-
cupation. As a result, RBI officials spend too much watching
the fluctuations of the Sensex and the rupee on trading
screens, ready to intervene in response to excess rupee
volatility. They spend too little time paying attention to the
problems of fraying notes and severe coin shortages faced by
well over a billion people, largely resulting from a cumula-
tive, ongoing decline in the internal value of the rupee.9
These stylised facts about the Fisher equation and UIP,
and the equally pressing considerations outlined in the above
paragraph too, call for a rethink of India’s huge tilt towards7 Any standard macroeconomics text, such as Mankiw (2010, pp.
94e98) explains the Fisher equation, while the text by McCallum
(1996, chap. 9) provides both a good exposition of the UIP condi-
tion and solid evidence against it. A staggering numbers of papers
have been written on the failure of UIP. The classic explanation,
based on risk premium in the efficients markets paradigm, is dis-
cussed by Engel (1996) while Frankel and Poonawala (2010) look at
differences in UIP across countries. A very noteworthy paper on
currency crashes by Brunnermeier, Nagel and Pedersen (2009) finds
that tightening interbank liquidity predicts carry trade losses.
8 Such a huge reversal for the low interest rate yen against the US
dollar occurred during the 1998 Asian crisis.
9 Quite recently, the DNA newspaper reported that, ‘fed up by the
constant shortage and increased black marketing of coins, wholesale
traders in Mumbai haveminted their own coins and are using them as
currency. So far, 50,000 coins of Rs. 1 and Rs. 2 have beenminted and
are being distributed in the wholesale markets of Bhendi Bazaar and
Masjid Bunder.. For one rupee coins worth Rs. 100, one has to pay
Rs.114, and for two rupee coins worth Rs. 100, one has to pay Rs.
115.’ (2012). If the above facts are authentic, it is a serious failure
of policy. The private minting of coins by wholesale traders in India’s
financial capital, indicates growing monetary instability in India.far greater external than domestic financial liberalisation.
Getting down to specific numbers, it is clearly evident that
Government bond yields, or G-Sec yields, have not kept pace
with actual or expected inflation. The Fisher equation does
not hold at all now in India. Expected inflation by the RBI’s
own survey is above 10%, and a three year moving average of
CPI (IW) (Consumer Price Index for Industrial Workers) has
also been above 10% for the last eight quarters.10 So if the
real return that bond holders would get in an unrestricted
market is, say 2%, then bond yields should now be at least
12%. These facts are clearly highlighted in Fig. 1.
Yet the benchmark G-Sec yield has roughly been in the
7.50%e8.50% range in the last two financial years ending this
March, and that too despite the huge fiscal deficit. Further,
shielding banks from the price risk of holding bonds by lax
accounting rules has reduced trading in the bond market. In
short, policies preventing the domestic bond market from
functioning properly need scrutiny and changes.
Non market borrowing
The suppression of bond market yields prevents the corporate
bondmarket from developing. But another very important but
neglected issue is that of non market borrowing. One way to
ensure realistic long-term yields is to align Small Savings and
Provident Fund (SSPF) deposit rates to inflation, and not to
bond yields. This will ensure that no matter what the opera-
tional andpolitical constraints in theGovernmentbondmarket
that keep bond yields low, SSPF depositors get adequately high
yields. Indirectly, then, there is pressure on G-Sec bond yields
to rise in accordance with SSPF yields. Hence, to align interest
rates with inflation and thus ensure a healthy financial system,
such simple changes can go a long way. To ensure realistic
yields, it may not be necessary right now to set up an inde-
pendent Debt Management Office (DMO), a sweeping change
with perhaps some unforeseeable and risky ramifications, that
many have been emphatically recommending.
As things stand, the final decisions about SSPF rates are still
made in Delhi. Further, the SSPF rates end up being somewhat
adjusted to inflation.11 However, various RBI Committees set
up to deal with this issue have all recommended bench-
marking of SSPF rates to bond yields, and not to inflation.1210 At higher frequencies, even one year and two years, let alone
intra-year, inflation is too volatile and noisy to be useful for anal-
ysis and policy formulation: it reflects shocks to the price level,
resulting in big swings in the inflation rate. In an article cited later
in this paper, I discuss the rationale for choosing the three year
average of inflation. The Chart here has used the CPI (IW) since the
new all-India CPI (Urban and Rural) series started last year provides
inflation data only for the first two months of 2012. Also, expected
inflation data are only upto December 2011.
11 For this fiscal year (2012e2013), the Provident Fund rate has
been raised to 8.6% from 8.25% last year. However this is still close
to prevailing bond yields, and lower than ongoing inflation.
12 The report of the Expert (YV Reddy) Committee to review the
System of Administered Interest Rates (October 2001) and Other
Issues and the report of the Advisory (Rakesh Mohan) Committee on
Administered Interest Rates and Rationalization of Small Savings
Instruments (May 2004) both recommended market benchmarking.
The report of the (Shyamala Gopinath) Committee on Compre-
hensive Review of National Small Saving Fund (June 2011) endorsed
the market benchmarking recommendation.
Figure 1 Expected inflation, three-year average of CPI inflation and benchmark G-Sec yield. Source: Handbook of Statistics on
Indian Economy and related data, available on RBI website (http://rbi.org.in/).
PhD in Economics from Andhra University for his thesis
‘Fiscal Reforms at the Sub-national Level’ (1998).
Dr Subbarao came into the Reserve Bank just a week
before the global financial crisis erupted in full in mid-
September 2008. He led the Reserve Bank’s effort to
mitigate the impact of the crisis on India and was
actively engaged in the G-20 effort to coordinate an
international response to the crisis. The challenges
ahead for the Reserve Bank, as he sees them, are to
bring inflation down, support the growth momentum
of the Indian economy, take financial sector reforms
forward and deepen financial inclusion.
Dr Subbarao maintains a strong commitment to
88 V. MoorthyBy contrast, in analysing how these Small Savings and Provi-
dent Fund rates should be set, I had suggested that inflation
benchmarking is preferable on various grounds, and specifi-
cally recommended indexation to a three year average of CPI
inflation (Moorthy, 2001). With the benchmark G-Sec bond
now in the 8.50% range, and real yields negative, the RBI’s
earlier recommendations on aligning SSPF rates to G-Sec
yields, repeated again in 2011, warrant a reexamination.
Interview with Dr Duvvuri Subbarao, Governor,
Reserve Bank of IndiaAbout Dr Duvvuri Subbarao
Dr Duvvuri Subbarao assumed office as the twenty-
second Governor of the Reserve Bank of India on 5
September 2008. Prior to this appointment, Dr Sub-
barao served as Finance Secretary to the Government
of India from April 2007 to September 2008 and as
Secretary to the Prime Minister’s Economic Advisory
Council from March 2005 to March 2007.
As a member of the Indian Administrative Service
(IAS), Dr Subbarao has been a career civil servant.
Between 1976 and 1998, he worked in various positions
in the state Government of Andhra Pradesh and in
Government of India.
Dr Subbarao was a Lead Economist in the World Bank
(1999e2004), where his responsibilities involved
advising developing countries on public finance
management. He also task managed a flagship study on
decentralisation across major East Asian countries
which was acknowledged as innovative policy work.
Dr Subbarao received a BSc (Hons) in Physics from the
Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur and an MSc in
Physics from the Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur.
He also has an MS in Economics from the Ohio State
University (1978) and was a Humphrey Fellow studying
public finance at MIT during 1982e83. He earned his
academic pursuits, and has written and lectured
extensively on issues in public finance, decentral-
isation and political economy of reforms at national
and international fora.Vivek Moorthy (VM): Dear Governor, let me thank you for
consenting to this interview just at financial year end,
a very busy time in your even otherwise tight schedule. For
starters, your job reminds me of two lines from a classic
poem by Lord Alfred Tennyson, ‘cannon to right of them,
cannon to left of them’.. From one side, you are under
perennial pressure from industry lobbies, sections of the
Finance Ministry, other policy makers and some ex World
Bank development economists, commentators and colum-
nists, to cut interest rates. From the other side, a few
economists like me have been very critical of the RBI for
almost always keeping interest rates too low. Sir, how do
you cope with these pressures?
Duvvuri Subbarao (DS): Prof. Moorthy, thank you for the
opportunity of this interview. I wish I could be poetic like
you, but for now I must stick to prose.
About battling the growth-inflation dynamics, it’s true
that over the last two years, the Reserve Bank has been
trying to manage the balance between supporting growth
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above 9% for much of the last calendar year. Growth has
moderated for a number of reasons e the external situa-
tion, the domestic policy context and also the monetary
tightening effected by the RBI.
There is an influential view that RBI must cut the policy
interest rate in order to stimulate growth. That is legiti-
mate criticism, and a view that I am sympathetic to. But, as
a public policy institution, the RBI must also be sensitive to
the voices that we don’t hear, the voices of the poor, who
are most hurt by inflation. So, as much as we hear the loud
and articulate voice for stimulating growth by reducing
interest rates, we also have to be sensitive to the majority
of the poor people who are hurt by inflation but who do not
have the opportunity to articulate their concerns. We have
to make that extra effort to ‘listen’ to them.
The second part of your question was about how I
withstand pressures: first, my conscience has to be clear
that when making decisions as the Governor of the Reserve
Bank, I am doing so with complete professional integrity;
second, one has to muster the courage to ‘lean against the
wind’ and take unpopular decisions; and third, one has to
learn to put long term interests ahead of short term
compulsions. As a public policy institution, the Reserve
Bank should be concerned about long term sustainability of
growth in an environment of low and stable inflation. I am
also deeply sensitive to the fact that history will evaluate
my record not by the results today but by the results down
the line. Being sensitive to that long term context helps me
cope with pressures.
Political constraints, infrastructure and GDP
growth
VM: Thank you Governor, that’s a wonderful start to our
discussions and it leads me to the second part of this
question. Sustainable growth requires ‘sustainable infra-
structure’. Under a regime of populist pricing for infra-
structure items, India manages to develop but cannot
sustain infrastructure. For instance, coal to run the newly
built power plants is increasingly not available. Given this
situation, is it possible for the RBI to educate those lobbying
for interest rate cuts and the public that, pending decon-
trol of subsidised prices, they should accept much lower
growth?
DS: Your view that India is an infrastructure constrained
economy is spot on. Strikingly, when most countries in the
world, particularly advanced economies, are demand con-
strained, India is quite contrarian in that we are a supply
constrained economy. Infrastructure is, by far, one of the
biggest supply constraints, and bridging the ‘infrastructure
deficit’ is one of the necessary condition for sustaining
India’s high growth rate.
You linked infrastructure supply to administered prices.
That link is important. Administered prices distort market
signals and impede efficiency. Like you say, the non-
adjustment of coal prices is affecting supply of coal to
power plants which in turn is choking power generation.
The Reserve Bank has consistently argued for reducing
subsidies, especially in the prices of petroleum products.
This ‘desubsidisation’ will be inflationary in the short-term,but efficiency enhancing in the medium to long term. We
can cope with the short-term inflation. Also, you have to
note that reducing subsidies will help contain the fiscal
deficit, and therefore, help contain inflation pressures.
About your query on the need for a compromise for
a lower growth rate, the Reserve Bank has been more
explicit than most others in arguing that in the short term
we may have to sacrifice a bit of growth in order to bring
inflation under control. Low and stable inflation is a neces-
sary pre-condition for sustained economic growth.
I do recognise that the trade-off that we are now talking
about is slightly different from the standard growth-
inflation trade-off. We are now talking about the trade-
off between administered prices and growth, which trans-
lates roughly to a trade-off between growth and welfare or
growth and equity. These are much larger debates, and
they will take us beyond the context of this interview.
However, I do want to say that we, as an economy, as
a democratic polity, need to address head on the trade-off
between short term compulsions and long term sustainable
growth.
Coming to the last part of your question, about an
educational campaign to generate support for some short
term sacrifices in order to secure long-term growth, the
Reserve Bank is very sensitive to its responsibility of
disseminating information and educating public opinion.
But the RBI cannot be alone in this endeavour. There have
to be academics such as yourself and institutions such as
the IIM, which also have to join in this much larger effort of
educating the public on the bigger choices in our public
policy.
VM: The RBI runs a financial literacy campaign and on
this front, now there is an increasing awareness to broach
these issues in the public domain.. But 2e3 years ago, the
RBI was also in the camp of ‘yes, India can grow at 8e9%’. I
think a certain dose of healthy realism is now entering the
policy portals ..
DS: We still stand by the statement that before the
crisis, the potential growth rate of the economy was 8.5%
(according to one of the RBI annual reports). But the
potential growth rate has come down after the crisis for
a number of reasons, including inflation. The fact that
today we are settling for a lower growth does not mean that
our potential growth was not higher at an earlier point of
time nor that it cannot go up again if we do all the right
things.
VM: I beg to differ on that, because our general
economic understanding is that potential growth is affected
by the underlying real side factors, rather than by inflation.
While the infrastructure is a constraint my personal view is
that labour supply also is a constraint, as in developed
countries. People who deal with the economics of daily life
know how hard it is these days to get labour, for a variety of
tasks. The inflation may have changed some of the medium
term dynamics of growth but regarding potential growth
itself, I doubt inflation affects it. Overall, we need a soft
focus approach, with emphasis on the political factors
determining potential GDP. We can’t bring that down to
a number.
DS: Based on cross-country as well as domestic experi-
ence, we are of the view that controlling inflation is
imperative to sustaining growth over the medium-term.
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climate, on which growth sustainability depends. Yes, you
are right especially about labour because we have abun-
dant labour but we have shortage of skilled labour. So,
factors of production are a constraint.
Domestic versus external financial
liberalisation
VM: The solidity of the Fisher effect combined with weak-
ness of the uncovered interest parity condition support the
policy position that greater domestic financial liberalisation
is desirable, while greater capital account convertibility is
not. Corporates and others invariably go in for low interest
rate External Commercial Borrowings and Foreign Currency
Convertible Bonds (FCCBs), and rationally do not hedge,
despite RBI’s remonstrance. They benefit until the rupee
tumbles and RBI then pumps in liquidity to bail them out, as
in late 2008. Should not RBI switch gears towards less rupee
convertibility and more domestic financial liberalisation?
DS: You have put forward solid academic evidence and I
cannot contest that lightly. But I do want to say that we
have to draw the right balance between domestic and
external financial liberalisation.
The Reserve Bank has consistently preferred a gradualist
approach to capital account opening. We have indicated an
explicit hierarchy of preferences. In so far as capital inflows
are concerned, we prefer equity to debt, long-term debt to
short-term debt, and direct investment to portfolio flows.
Our prime objectives here have been to encourage capital
inflows (since this not only supplements domestic capital
formation and domestic economic growth but also funds
the Current Account Deficit), while at the same time
keeping our external debt liabilities within manageable
levels as also minimizing our dependence on short term and
volatile capital flows. We have taken measures to
encourage FDI and we have taken measures to gradually
liberalise outflows. Our approach to capital account liber-
alisation can be best described as ‘festina lente’, which is
Latin for ‘make haste slowly’.
On domestic financial liberalisation, there have been
very impressive developments in terms of institutions,
instruments and products. We have also made progress in
aligning our regulatory framework with international best
practices.
Domestic and external financial liberalisation have to go
hand in hand. For domestic financial liberalisation, non-
resident participation in domestic financial markets and
residents’ access to international financial markets become
necessary. Therefore, domestic financial liberalisation and
capital account convertibility are sometimes linked.
However it has been the endeavour of the Reserve Bank to
liberalise the domestic financial system gradually and
sequentially without compromising financial stability.
In liberalising the domestic and external financial
sectors, we have tried to ensure a level playing field in so
far as the regulatory framework is concerned between the
purely domestic financial sector players and the multina-
tional financial sector players.
VM: Regarding the point that financial liberalisation and
capital account convertibility are related, when I wastalking about capital account, I was talking more about
inflows rather than outflows. I am all for liberalising for
domestic residents and entities, but not for inflows, and
have written along these lines, suggesting ‘Speed up and go
slow’ since February 1997 (Moorthy, 1999, 2008a, b). It is
very tempting, because there is the need for money, to
keep attracting it. Last month, in the Budget supplement in
the Financial Express, the headline was titled, ‘Restless
global capital, turn this way!’. Whereas the role model for
capital account policy, according to me, should be ‘Restless
global capital must be kept at bay!’.
The other point I wanted to make is that, as you have
stressed, we do follow the norms of keeping short term
debt under control. In a sense it’s correct that the explicit
carry trade is not prevalent because short term debt is
banned. But there are quasi carry trades because people
borrow at lower rates abroad and they put it in the equity
markets here. We saw this as early as mid 2007, in the melt
down in the equity market, just after Paribas declared
losses, and the quasi carry trade reversed. There needs to
be some attempt to enforce some capital controls.
DS: That sort of debate about the pace and sequencing
of our external sector liberalisation is very value adding.
VM: In this context, why are rupeeerupee convertible
bonds not allowed for domestic entities although foreign
currency convertible bonds (FCCBs) are widespread?
DS: The issue of allowing rupee denominated bonds
(convertible into equity or otherwise) has been examined
by us on various occasions. Surely, there could be certain
benefits associated with this product. For example, the
currency risk is borne by the non resident lenders vis-a-vis
the domestic borrower unlike in the case of normal
FCCBs. However, we need to recognise that allowing rupee
denominated bonds outside India is a significant step
towards capital account convertibility, since it would not
only involve issuance of rupee denominated instruments
outside India, but also raise the issue of allowing a formal
mechanism for rupee hedging outside India. Alternatively
(if a formal rupee hedging mechanism is not provided
outside India), it would fuel the NDF market. We cannot
countenance this at this juncture, given our external sector
vulnerabilities and macroeconomic constraints.
We should also remember that one of the important
public policy objectives has been the development of
a vibrant domestic bond market. Encouraging rupee
denominated bonds outside India can be considered at an
appropriate time along with other significant steps to
develop the domestic bond market.
As per the prevailing SEBI regulations, there is no
prohibition on convertible debt instruments being issued by
resident corporates in the domestic market where the
rupee debt gets converted into equity after a specified
period of time.The domestic bond market
VM: Based on expected inflation in the range of 11e12%, by
the Fisher equation the benchmark ten year G-Sec yield
should be at least 12%, well above the roughly 8.30e8.60%
range currently prevailing. Even going by CPI inflation,
averaging about 9e10% in recent years, the G-Sec bond
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about this suppression of yields, especially when fiscal
deficits are so high?
DS: It is true that large fiscal deficits are putting pres-
sure on domestic interest rates, but to characterise this as
artificial suppression, financial repression as you call it,
would be incorrect. In fact, over a period of time, we have
taken a host of measures to liberalise the markets. We have
come a long way from what can be considered ‘financial
repression’. For example, the RBI entered into a supple-
mental agreement with the government on ending ad hoc
treasury bills; second, through the late 80s and 90s, we
moved to a market determined system of interest rates for
raising public debt by developing new auction based
instruments and practices. And third, the Fiscal Responsi-
bility and Budget Management Act (FRBM) came into effect
which prohibited RBI from entering into the primary G-Sec
market. I have recounted these measures to underscore
that a number of initiatives have been taken to develop the
domestic G-Sec market and to make it efficient.
Now, whether or not the current market yields are funda-
mentallydetermined isa deeperquestion. The simplemathof
the Fisherequation, of course, suggests that the yieldsmaybe
lower than warranted. But its interpretation is complex. The
Fisher equation provides a linear approximation that suggests
that the nominal rates equal the real rate plus expected
inflation. But in India, determining both expected inflation
and the real rate is difficult.
So, when you look at yields today, two different inter-
pretations are possible. One way of looking at it is to
assume a real rate and expected inflation to determine
a normative yield, and interpret the gap as being financial
repression. Another way to look at it, certainly positive
from the RBI’s perspective, is that since market yields are
indeed lower, this implies lower expected inflation.
It can be argued that if yields are low in spite of large
government borrowing, the Reserve Bank does deserve
some credit for keeping long term inflation expectations
under control.
Having said that, I also want to add that there are other
reasons for yields being softer than you think they should
be. For example, in recent weeks, the Reserve Bank has
done sizeable open market operations. We have also
gradually opened up our debt market to foreign investors
in a limited and calibrated manner. All these measures
have contributed to softening the yield, and I don’t believe
the domestic G-Sec market can be characterised as artifi-
cially repressed.
VM: I grant that there has been tremendous progress
compared to the situation in 1987e1989. The Statutory
Liquid Ratio (SLR) was then 38.5% but now banks hold
government bonds voluntarily. That’s a huge change. But
again the word I have used is ‘suppression’ which is
different from artificial repression. Suppression is much
milder and it is indirect. While granting that progress has
been made over the 90s, has there been some reversal of
the progress in the last few years, roughly since when you
have taken over? And that’s what I want to focus on. Apart
from the high expected inflation, market yields are moving
higher up, yields on some Certificates of Deposit (CDs) are
now over 11e12%. So, it’s not just a mechanical Fisher
equation but other factors are also indicating that bondyields should be higher. At the same time, an easy money
policy, by lowering the short rate, can temporarily bring
down the long rate without coercion, but that doesn’t
guarantee it can continue to do that over time. In this
connection, although market yields are low, that does not
imply ‘lower expected inflation’ as you have stated above.
DS: It would be incorrect and inappropriate to eval-
uate what happened in last the 3e4 years as if it
happened in a normal situation. We had an extraordinary
crisis, there was fiscal stimulus, and the credit demand of
the private sector had gone down. It became slightly
easier for the government to borrow immediately after
the crisis when private demand was low, but now that
private credit demand is picking up, government yields
are coming under pressure. Admittedly, there is
suppression to the extent that there is an SLR require-
ment, but our objective is that markets should reflect
fundamentals as much as possible.
VM: Perhaps it was not appropriate of me to say only last
3e4 years because some of this reversal of the ending of
financial repression has taken place over the last 7e8 years.
The RBI was moving to fully mark to market on government
bonds and then when they collapsed in 2004, it allowed the
banks to transfer them to the Held to Maturity category. So,
banks are not bearing enough of the price risks of holding
these bonds, that is one factor. Personally, I don’t give too
much attention to the derivatives market, and even this
emphasis on the absence of an independent Debt Manage-
ment Office (DMO) as the fundamental factor holding back
the bond market may be overdone.
However the yields in the spot bondmarket, irrespective of
how the initial financing is done.it seem tome is very critical.
There is scope for getting India’s bond yields to reflect under-
lying fundamentals. The Fisher equation holds amazingly well
evenwith about 200basis points difference in inflation, looking
at Taiwan and comparable major ASEAN countries (Malaysia,
Thailand, and South Korea). Taiwan’s long term yields are
generally below 2%, while for these other countries, long term
yieldsareusually in the3.5e4%range.That is a signofahealthy
bond market as distinct from a market with a lot of trading,
daily marking to market and so on.
VM: Similarly, is anything being done to develop the
corporate bond market?
DS: Yes, a lot of things are being done to develop the
corporate bond market. There was the R.H. Patil
Committee in 2005 which made a number of recommen-
dations for developing the domestic corporate bond market
relating to rationalising the primary issuance procedure,
facilitating exchange trading, enhancing the disclosure and
transparency standards and strengthening the clearing and
settlement mechanisms in the secondary market.
You must also recognise that it is SEBI which is the
regulator for the bond markets. The Reserve Bank comes
into the picture only by way of regulating repos in corpo-
rate bonds. And in this regard, we have taken a number of
initiatives. I will just cite a few. We permitted clearing
houses of exchanges to have a fund account with the RBI to
facilitate DVP-1 based settlement of trades, we have
allowed repos in corporate bonds and we have introduced
credit default swaps effective December 1, 2011.
I don’t want to go into a lot of detail, but I do want to
highlight that there are micro issues and macro issues in the
13 The precise formula I had was R(SSPF) Z 2% þ 3 year Average
of CPI (average basis) and the deposits should be non taxable,
Moorthy (2001). Regarding taxes, see the follow up article Moorthy
(2003).
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issues are structural in nature and they are related to
overall demand in the market. The micro issues relate to
the micro structure and are largely on the supply side. What
we e the regulators and the government e have attempted
so far is entirely on the micro side, from the supply side.
This is necessary but not sufficient. We need to address also
macro issues such as, for example, standardising stamp
duty across all the states, the dominant corporate prefer-
ence for private placement of bonds and the limited
investor base.
The regulatory norms governing investment by pension
and provident funds in corporate banks are stringent, and
there are restrictions on issuance of securitised instru-
ments. You are of course, familiar with all of them.
All our efforts so far have been toward improving the
supply side. We need to focus on addressing issues on the
demand side.
VM: The initiatives taken by RBI to develop the corporate
bond market are quite impressive and commendable, but
require a well functioning Government bond market to have
the desired impact. Another vital issue is non-market
borrowing. It seems to me in all the discussions taking
place in the newspapers and so on, not enough attention is
paid to the non-market borrowing. There is scope for simple
changes to align interest rates with inflation and ensure
a healthy financial system. The way I see it, a vibrant bond
market is just one way of having a healthy financial system
i.e. in which interest rates don’t give negative real returns.
The various RBI Committees advocated benchmarking the
small savings rate to G-Sec yields. Now, when the G-Sec
yield is itself below inflation then you are spreading this sort
of mild financial repression throughout the economy,
whereas if you align it to inflation automatically that would
raise rates in one part. That would give a slight upward
thrust to the yields in the G-Sec markets. So, is it possible
that the RBI will re-visit the issue and recommend some-
thing along those lines to indicate that you are not averse to
positive real rates to depositors?
DS: I am aware of your very thoughtful writings on this
subject over years, particularly of your recommendation that
non-market borrowing interest rates must be aligned with
inflation. You have mentioned a number of committees. The
latest in this series is the Shyamala Gopinath Committee
which recommended also that the interest rates on small
savings fromprovident fundsbealignedwithG-Secyields. The
government moved in that direction recently when it made
upwards adjustment of interest rates on these instruments.
On G-Sec yields in general, my understanding is slightly
different from yours. You enjoy the luxury of being an
academic. Please allow me put across the real world
perspective. First, it is not true that G-Sec yields are
completely detached from inflation. They do reflect infla-
tion expectations in ways other than the Fisher equation
that we talked about earlier. So, benchmarking of the
interest rates on small savings and provident funds to the
yields on G-Sec in a way reflects the rate of inflation. The
government has stepped forward to align the interest rate
on non-market borrowings, something that we, in the RBI,
have consistently been recommending.
Of course, you are talking about going a further step
forward which is to index them to inflation itself. That ishighly recommended because it helps savers to hedge
against inflation, presumably reduces uncertainties for the
government and improves monetary transmission which is
important from the RBI perspective.
But two problems: one we do not have consistent esti-
mates of real rates of interest, and second, we have no
single representative consumer price inflation rate for the
whole country. The new CPI series is yet to be tested. In
order to have inflation indexed bonds, we need credible
estimates of both real interest rate and inflation, which we
do not have as of now. But as we move towards that,
perhaps we can align interest rates on non-market
borrowings to inflation.
We have of course to do some homework before we can
introduce inflation indexed bonds. In particular, I request
you to find a measure that smooths out volatility of G-Sec
yields and identify an estimate or measure to which we can
index interest rates on non-market borrowings.
VM: When people talk about inflation indexed bonds,
they usually mean tradable debts. I am talking about non-
tradable Small Savings and Provident Fund (SSPF)
deposits. You just choose what is the best representative
measure of inflation (say CPI), take some low frequency
measure (say three year average) and add a 2% real return,
which is not much. So if the three year moving average of
CPI inflation is 7e8%, you give that person 9e10%, as per
the formula that I had worked out in recommendations to
the Reddy Committee.13 Ensuring that the real rates are
slightly positive gives a lot of stability to the financial
system, without the threat of sudden redemptions, as for
tradable debt. It gives the government a stable source of
financing as opposed to a captive one, such as created by
the SLR (It is unlikely to be a captive source of saving like
SLR securities because you are guaranteeing a positive real
rate). Moreover, if you look at the experience of the East-
Asian countries they didn’t develop the bond market that
much, but they ensured positive returns to savings because
they kept inflation very low (except for China where
perhaps depositors get negative real rates). Without
following the market camp to extremes, we can have
a healthy borrowing market.
DS: All this is well taken. But one of the big concerns
about inflation indexed bonds or indeed indexing non-
market borrowings to inflation is that inflation has been
high. Perhaps this is what is inhibiting the government from
accepting them now. Understandably, they will want to
wait till inflation is relatively low and stable. Hopefully we
will get to that soon, but meanwhile, will you kindly do the
homework and tell us how to do this so that when inflation
comes down, we can hit the ground running.
VM: Turning to the money market, in recent weeks,
borrowing at the repo window has been over 1 lakh crores.
The RBI is comfortable in allowing repo window borrowing
of up to 1% of deposits (Net Demand and Time Liabilities).
That is little over Rs. 60,000 crores, less than half of the
current level of over 1 lakh crores. Either the repo rate
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RBI should announce that it expects this large volume of
borrowing to be temporary. Market participants are looking
for guidance (For those unfamiliar with Indian notation, 1
crore equals 10 million).
DS: It is true that in the recentperiod, borrowing at the LAF
repo window has been quite on the higher side. It is also true
that RBI has indicated that the comfort zone of lending
through the repo window is broadly at 1% of NDTL, which
translates to an amount of Rs. 600 billion.While looking at the
comfort zone, the amount of borrowing at the repo window
has to be adjusted for the Government’s balance with RBI to
determine the amount lent to the system by RBI. Hence, one
has to provide for higher magnitude of borrowings whenever
there is huge positive balance of GoI kept with RBI. This is
reckoned as the frictional factor.
One of the big challenges for the Reserve Bank over the
last year and a half has been to manage liquidity in an
inflationary situation. We recognise that liquidity has to be
in a deficit mode to indicate our anti-inflationary stance as
also to ensure effective monetary policy transmission, but
not such an excessive deficit. On the other hand, the repo
interest rate has to signal our anti-inflationary stance. The
Reserve Bank has been facing a dilemma on managing
liquidity without diluting our anti-inflationary stance. Our
effort has been to delink liquidity management from
inflation management.
VM: Going beyond monetary policies, would you like to
share some of your own experiences in switching from the
finance ministry to RBI?
DS: Shifting from the Finance Ministry to the RBI has
been a big experience for me e in emotional and intellec-
tual terms. You are perhaps aware that I had made this
transition from the North Block to the Mint Street in less
than 24 hours. Of course, among my distinguished prede-
cessors, there were other Finance Secretaries to Govern-
ment of India who too became Governors, but the transition
in their case was not as abrupt as mine. They had time to
cope with the transition, a comfort that I was denied.
There are several important differences in the way the
Government functions and the Reserve Bank functions. In
the Government, you are directly exposed to the compul-
sions of democratic politics whereas the RBI is insulated
from that. What this implies is that in the Government, it is
possible that decisions are excessively influenced by short-
term concerns, but in the Reserve Bank, you always have to
play for the long-term.
As Finance Secretary, my job was to advise the Govern-
ment on policy matters and operationalise the implementa-
tion of policy decisions. Here in the RBI, the responsibility for
decisionmaking rests entirelywithme. The ‘buck stops’ with
me as it were. In the Government, accountability mecha-
nisms are diverse, different and oftentimes diffused. In the
Reserve Bank, I enjoy a large amount of autonomy, but I am
also accountable for the results of my decisions. There is
therefore a larger burden onme to disseminate the rationale
for our decisions and actions.
VM: And one last question. You were a topper in Physics
in Kanpur and Kharagpur and then again at the All India Civil
Service exam. On balance, has the rigour of physics helped
you in your work in the messy of world of monetary policy?
Or has it been a negative?DS: Physics is an incredibly fascinating subject with mind
bending concepts and theories. The rigour of Physics has
certainly helped me in enhancing my analytical capabilities
and reasoning faculties. But I do recognise that the real
world is a lot different from Physics. In the real world of
public policy making, we have to be sensitive to the fact
that there are no immutable laws. Everything is condi-
tioned by human behaviour, and policy making has to adjust
to that reality. So, as much as Physics gives you the mental
discipline, in order to be a good public policy maker, you
have to recognise that the real world does not obey any
immutable laws like the laws of Physics.
VM: Thank you Governor. It has been a pleasure and
a special privilege for me to interview you, Sir.
DS: Thank you very much Professor Moorthy. The depth
and incisiveness of your questions have been very impres-
sive. I am also deeply impressed by your knowledge across
so many different areas including your deep understanding
of the Reserve Bank policies. Thank you very much once
again for this opportunity to which I attach a lot of value.
Note: The author wishes to thank V Ravi Kumar, currently
Professor of Finance, St. Josephs College of Business
Administration, and formerly Country Head, India, ING-Vysya
Bank, for valuable suggestions in preparing the interview
questions, and also Prof Sankarsan Basu, IIMB, and a referee
for their comments. The author’s articles cited here are
available on his website http://economicsperiscope.com/.
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